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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
class with a short address upon the problems of young attorneys in the
practice, which was very much appreciated by the class.
Hon. M. T. Kelley, of the Pineville Bar, has agreed to give a
series of lectures on adverse possession. Mr. Kelley has made a
special study of this phase of the law and his lectures will be of much
value to the students and others who may be able to hear them.
Several hundred volumes have been added to the library recently,
so that it now contains more than ten thousand well-selected law books.
The practice court work is being more successfully done this year
by dividing the class into small sections and requiring three recitation periods each week from each section. Judge Lafferty has prepared
a Practice Manual for the use of the students, which classifies the
year's work into contested and uncontested cases, and carries the class
over all the phases of the practice possible to be covered in one year's
work.
Commandant Fairfax has kindly consented to permit the first
year law students to drill one year in the battalion with all the honors
and privileges of students from the other departments.

UNRECORDED TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND
WIFE.
1.

AND

The Problem Stated.

The Weisinger Act of 1894 abrogated almost completely the common law doctrine of a feme covert's disability, so that a married
woman can deal with strangers almost as freely as can a married
man. It was once thought that the Weisinger Act did not affect the
common law doctrine of the oneness of husband and wife, and that
therefore a married woman still could not contract with her husband;
see Stroud v. Ross, 118 Ky., 630, 82 S. W., 254, 26 Ky. L. Rep., 521.
But that idea has been repudiated by the later cases; Coleman v. Coleman, 142 Ky., 36, 133 S. W., 1003; Niles v. Niles, 143 Ky., 94, 136 S.
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W., 127. And under the present Kentucky law a wife can deal with her
husband upon exactly the same terms as with a stranger, subject only
to the limitation that "a gift, transfer, or assignment of personal property between husband and wife shall not be valid as to third persons,
unless the same be in writing, and acknowledged and recorded as
chattel mortgages are required by law to be acknowledged and recorded." Ky. St., See. 2128.
The purpose of this essay is to inquire into the meaning of that
statutory limitation. In other words, when may a transaction be
attacked because it is between spouses and not recorded, although the
same transaction between strangers would not be subject to attack?
It should be noted that transactions between spouses, whether recorded or unrecorded, are frequently set aside for reasons which
would equally affect transactions between strangers; for example, because actually or constructively fraudulent toward creditors or because preferential; but this paper will not deal with such cases exce:pt
to distinguish them from cases involving the question propounded
above.
2. Who May Attack the Transaction?
The statute provides that unrecorded gifts, transfers, or assignments of personalty between spouses shall not be valid as to third
persons. The wife cannot avoid a transaction with her husband upon
any ground which would not apply equally to a transaction with a
stranger. It may still be true that a wife cannot convey land directly
to her husband; see Newly v. Cox (1883), 81 Ky., 58, 4 Ky. L. Rep.,
744. If so, that is because a conveyance of real estate from a married
woman is invalid unless her husband join as grant3r or is already
grantor in a previous deed. Ky. St., See. 506. Obviously a man cannot
be both grantor and grantee of the same grant. On similar reasoning it may be that a married woman cannot contract with her husband
to convey to him her real estate, because her executory contract to
convey realty is not good unless her husband join. Ky. St., See. 2128.
Obviously a man .cannot be both promisor and promisee of the same
promise. With this explanation, it will be seen that the case of land
does not really constitute an exception to the statement that a wife
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cannot avoid a transaction with her husband upon any ground which
would not apply equally to a transaction with a stranger.
Likewise, a husband cannot avoid a transaction with his wife
upon any ground which would not apply equally to a transaction with
a stranger.
Heirs, devisees, distributees, and legatees are not considered
"third persons" within the meaning of the statutory provision under
discussion; and an unrecorded gift between spouses which would be
valid if between strangers, cannot be set aside at the instance of
such volunteers, MoWethy's Admx. v. McCight, 141 Ky., 816, 133 S.
W., 1001. But it should be noted that a gift from wife to husband
will be closely scrutinized for undue influence and that here the burden
is upon the husband to show that the gift was made voluntarily by the
wife. Long v. Beard, 20 Ky. L. Rep., 1036, 48 S. W. 158; Buckel v.
Smith's Admr., 26 Ky. L. Rep., 494, 82 S. W., 235. This matter of
the onus probandi is the only respect in which gifts between strangers
differ from gifts .between spouses when the question is raised by
volunteers.
The words "third persons" here include, however, purchasers,
existing creditors, and probably subsequent creditors. In McWethy's
Admx. v. MeCright, supra, the court said:
"The words "third persons" * * * as used in the statute do not refer to or include a person * * * who has
no interest in the property given or conveyed, or does not sustain
to the donor the relation of creditor or to the property that of
an innocent purchaser. * * * The object of the statute is
to compel the giving * * * of notice * * * to creditors
and purchasers and also others who might have an interest in
the property transferred. * * * A creditor for whom the
notice is required and who would be prejudicially affected by the
gift can act upon it by refusing the donor further credit or taking the legal steps necessary to subject the property to his debt."
Doubtless a person having an equitable interest which would be
cut off by a bona fide sale to an outsider, can have set aside an unrecorded sale to the husband or wife of the trustee or legal owner.
A creditor, purchaser, or other interested party, who has actual
notice of the transaction, cannot complain of want of the constructive
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notice afforded by a recorded instrument. Jones v. Louisville Tobacco
Warehouse Co., 135 Ky., 824.
Cases Where There Is No Consideration.
A gift to a stranger may be attacked by a creditor of the donor
whose debt existed at the time the gift was made. Ky. St., See. 1907.
The invalidity of such gifts to a spouse, whether recorded or unrecorded, therefore, does not involve our peculiar problem when the attack is made by an existing creditor. It should be noted, however,
that the furnishing of necessaries to one's wife, sometimes loosely called
giving, is not really a gift but the performance of a legal duty, and
cannot be successfully attacked even by a prior creditor.
Where the attack is made by subsequent creditors, a gift to a
stranger cannot be set aside unless made with actual fraudulent intent.
Is the rule otherwise as to gifts between spouses? A valid gift to a
stranger is accompanied by a change of possession or by a recorded
instrument. Ky. St. See. 1908. Prospective creditors of the donor
are not likely to be misled; but a change of possession between husband
and wife cannot be detected by the naked eye of a prospective creditor.
Unless a gift between spouses is recorded, outsiders are apt to extend
further credit in reliance upon the supposition that the donor still
has title. Without over-emphasizing the force of a mere dictum, attention may in this connection be again called to the passage already
quoted from the opinion in McWethy's Admx. v. Mcright.
3.

"A creditor for whom the notice is required *
act upon it by refusing the donor further credit."

*

*

can

The husband's creditors sometimes complain that he has expended his own means in improving his wife's real estate. When the
husband was solvent at the time and there was no fraudulent intent,
even existing creditors cannot successfully attack the transaction.
NationalRoofing Material Co. v. Smith, 165 Ky., 848, 178 S. W., 1125.
Where there is no intention to defraud and the improvements cannot
be subjected to the husband's debts without substantially taking the
wife's own property, the same thing is true. Robinson v. Huffman, 15
B. Mon., 82, as explained in Heck v. Fisher,78 Ky., 643. Where there
is actual fraudulent intent in which the wife actively participates, per-
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haps she may be deprived of title to satisfy creditors. That question
is raised but not-answered by the opinion in the last named case. The
same case decides that where the wife knows of the husband's actually
fraudulent intent and acquiesces in it, the chancellor may through a
receiver rent out the property and apply to existing debts the increase in the rental value due to the improvements. These results do
not involve our peculiar problem, for the same results are reached when
the land improved is not that of a wife. Athey v. Kiiotts, 6 B. Mon., 24;
Newcomb v. Phillips, 10 Ky. L. Rep., 552, 9 S. W., 529. It is submitted that improving another's land is not a gift "of personal property" and that the statutory provision under consideration does not
apply to such transactions.
The question of life insurance for the benefit of a spouse or
assigned to a spouse, which logically belongs here, is reserved for discussion in a later article.
4.

Cases Where There Is Consideration.

The statutory requirement of record is not confined to gifts but
applies also to "transfers" and "assignments" of personal property
between husband and wife. In Stix v. Calender, 155 Ky., 806, 160
S. W., 514, in which an unrecorded gift was set aside at the suit of
existing creditors, the court seems to have assumed that the result
would have been otherwise if the wife had furnished consideration
for the transfer. That assumption, however, in no way affects the
decision. In National Roofing Material Co. v. Smith, supra, the contention that an unrecorded transfer from husband to wife was bad
as to existing creditors, failed. There was in fact no fraudulent intent. It was not constructively fraudulent because made in satisfaction
of pre-existing debts due the wife. It was not a voidable preference
because more than six months had elapsed'before the suit was brought.
After correctly deciding these points, the court upheld the wife's right
to retain the property without discussing the provisions of See. 2128.
On this point the case is authority for no more than the proposition
that the lack of record must be specially pleaded, and unless it is so
pleaded the objecting creditor cannot take advantage of it.
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With these two cases which point toward the idea that "transfer" and "assignment" mean nothing more than "gift" in the statute
under consideration, compare Eberhardt v. Wahl's Admr, 124 Ky.,
223, 98 S. W., 994, 30 Ky.L. Rep., 412, and Jones v. Louisville Tobacco
Warehouse Co., 135 Ky., 824, 121 S. W., 633, 123 S. W. 307. In the
former, a husband pledged stock to his wife as security against loss
to her by reason of her property being pledged to secure his debt to a
third person. It was said that the pledge was bad as against his
creditors because unrecorded, although the decision protected her interests in another way. In the latter case, it was said that a pledge
of personal property to secure the payment of rent due from the
husband to the wife was invalid as against innocent creditors. Not
only was this security for an existing debt, but there was the new consideration of the wife's refraining from bringing legal proceedings
to enforce her statutory landlord's lien. There can be no doubt that
in a case in which the point is involved and properly presented, the
court will squarely hold that transfers of personal property from
husband to wife are invalid against creditors unless recorded, notwithstanding the presence of consideration.
Granting that this is true, it remains to consider the effect of
such invalidity and what transactions should be called transfers of
personal property. Upon these questions, we get little help from the
decisions.
Suppose that a husband has transferred a horse to his wife in
exchange for a cow. Creditors who seek to subject the horse to the
husband's debts manifestly ought not to be permitted to blow both
hot and cold at the same time. If the transaction is set aside, the cow is
still the wife's. If the husband has in the meantime sold the cow and
the proceeds can be traced, he should hold those proceeds in constructive trust for the wife. If the proceeds cannot be traced, quaere,
should she not have a quasi contractual claim for the value of her cow,
upon which claim she should receive a pro rata distribution along
with other unsecured creditors?
Suppose that a husband has transferred to his wife a horse in
exchange for her promise to pay him fifty dollars. If the transfer is
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set aside at the suit of creditors the consideration for her promise has
failed and it is unenforceable.
Suppose that a wife has transferred to her husband a cow in exchange for his promise to pay her fifty dollars. Creditors would probably prefer to let the wife prorate on her debt, rather than have the
cow or its proceeds taken out of the husband's assets. If we are right
in our postulate that the transaction must be set aside as a whole,
if at all, no attack would be made when the cow is still in the husband's
hands or the proceeds can be traced. If he has disposed of the cow
and the proceeds cannot be traced, again, quaere, ought she not to
have a quasi contractual claim for the value of her cow if she is compelled to give up her contractual claim?
Suppose that the wife has permitted the husband to use her land
in exchange for his promise to pay her a thousand dollars. Waiving
the question whether a right to get money rent is realty or personalty and treating it merely as a debt, an assignment of a rent note
by a landlord to his wife would come within the statutory provision.
But it is submitted that the creation of a debt from husband to wife
which never existed before is neither a transfer nor an assignment of
property. The words "tranfer" and "assignment" connote the idea
that something which formerly belonged to one person now belongs
to another. But the right to collect rent never belonged to the debtor.
It has never existed save as the property of the creditor. How then
can it have been transferred or assigned from the debtor to the creditor? This somewhat finespun theory may be bolstered up by the re,
sut although not by any language in the opinion in Jones v. Louisville
Tobacco Warehouse Co., supra. There it was held that even as against
pre-existing creditors, a wife may assert her statutory landlord's
lien to secure rent which her husband had promised to pay in an unrecorded lease. Obviously, the lien is secondary and the obligation to pay
is primary. The security provided by the statute would not be available unless the debt is an enforceable one indepedent of the lien
statute.
Suppose that the husband has pledged a horse to the wife to secure a debt to her. The unrecorded pledge would be, invalid as to
third persons; but that in itself would not affect the validity of the
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debt and the wife might share in a distribution of the husband's assets along with other unsecured creditors.
Suppose that the husband has transferred a horse to the wife in
satisfaction of a pre-existing debt. Even if the period for attacking preferences as such has expired, creditors should be able to invalidate the unrecorded transfer, but-that would leave the wife with
an unsatisfied unsecured claim.
The results worked out above follow logically from the postulate
that transactions between husband and wife should be set aside as a
whole, if at all. Those results may prove shocking to lawyers anxious
to protect the rights of creditors. But it should be borne in mind
that we are now dealing with cases where consideration is present and
there is no application for the maxim, "A man must be just before
he is generous." It should also be borne in mind that where the
spouses have actual intent to defraud creditors, the transaction can be
set aside upon grounds which have nothing to do with the peculiar
relation of husband and wife.
The idea underlying the statute here discussed is that since change
of possession between spouses affords no notice to an outsider of a
change in the situation of the parties while a change of possession
between strangers does, therefore a record should be necessary to
make valid a transaction between spouses where a change of possession
is necessaryj and sufficient between strangers. The creation of unsecured debts between strangers involves neither a record nor
a change of possession which other creditors can observe. While the
results for the hypothetical cases stated above were reached without
inquiring whether a creditor could observe the change in situation
when similar transactions occur between strangers, it is interesting to
notice that those conclusions do not conflict in any instance with that
general idea underlying the statute.
REUBEN B. HUTCHCRAFT, JR.

